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In the Best Interests of the Child:
An Analysis of Wisconsin Supreme Court Rulings
Involving Same-Sex Couples with Children
Amy Persin Linnert
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of same-sex couples and the legal obstacles they face has
been the subject of countless articles, comments and notes. Although this
Note may be added to the list, it is unique because it focuses on Wisconsin,
a state with a history of liberal political views and legal innovations.' An
analysis of Wisconsin's approach to legal issues of same-sex couples is
particularly noteworthy because Wisconsin is one of only a handful of
states that explicitly prohibits discrimination against individuals on the
basis of sexual orientation.2 However, this prohibition is not absolute. It
has been limited to the following areas: housing;3 civil service;' state
contracts;5 the national guard;6 municipal officers and employees;7 state
agencies;' state officers and employees;9 the University of Wisconsin
system' and vocational, technical and adult education." The failure to
extend this protection to homosexuals in all areas of the law has harmful
repercussions, not only for the homosexual individual, but also for the
* B.A., Saint Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1993; J.D., University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, 2001.
1. See generally JOSEPH A. RANNEY, TRUSTING NOTHING TO PROVIDENCE: A HISTORY OF
WISCONSIN'S LEGAL SYSTEM (1999).
2. See Wis. STAT. § 111.31 (2000). Other states include California, Hawaii, Minnesota,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey and the District of Columbia. See
Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 1033, 1082 n.276.
3. See Wis. STAT. §§ 16.765, 66.1011, 66.1213, 66.1301, 106.50, 234.29 (2000).
4. See Wis. STAT. § 230.18 (2000).
5. See Wis. STAT. § 16.765 (2000).
6. See Wis. STAT. § 21.35 (2000).
7. See Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (2000).
8. See Wis. STAT. § 15.04 (2000).
9. SeeWIS. STAT. §§ 111.81, 111.85 (2000).
10. See Wis. STAT. § 36.12 (2000).
11. See Wis. STAT. § 38.23 (2000).
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increasing number of children being raised by homosexuals.,2
This Note reviews three recent Wisconsin Supreme Court cases and the
tortured logic the Justices employed either to grant or deny, as the case may
be, same-sex partners the rights commonly granted to married heterosexual
partners who petition for adoption, custody or visitation. This Note also
discusses the underlying issue of same-sex marriage, but only indirectly as
both a source of tension in the judicial opinions and a proposed solution to
the more pressing problem of children who are often the unintended and/or
unforeseen victims of the stigma surrounding same-sex couples. Part II
provides an overview of the current state of family law, including the "best
interests of the child" standard courts often use when deciding issues of
adoption, custody and visitation. Part III critiques the Wisconsin Supreme
Court cases decided in the last decade dealing with the rights of same-sex
partners in the areas of adoption, custody and visitation. Part IV suggests
legalization of same-sex marriage as a solution to the legal problems faced
by same-sex couples with children.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. MARRIAGE
Marriage is an important social institution and as such, is favored by
public policy and the law.'3 States have an interest in promoting and
protecting the institution of marriage as a means of preserving the social
order.'4 Consequently, marriage serves a predictive function in society as
evidenced, for example, by the legal presumption that a child born into an
existing marriage is the legitimate child of the husband.'5 Although this
Note argues that the legalization of same-sex marriages will further
Wisconsin public policy by preserving the sanctity of marriage and
protecting the children of same-sex couples, the unfounded fear and hatred
of the homosexual lifestyle has generally prevented states from sanctioning
such unions.
Although marriage is recognized as a fundamental right,' 6 it is subject
12. The ACLU estimates the total number of children nationwide living with at least one
gay parent ranges from six to fourteen million. See ACLU Fact Sheet: Overview of Lesbian
and Gay Parenting, Adoption and Foster Care (visited Mar. 1, 2001)
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay/parent.html>.
13. See Wis. STAT. § 944.01 (2000) ("The state recognizes that it has a duty to encourage
high moral standards. Although the state does not regulate the private sexual activity of
consenting adults, the state does not condone or encourage any form of sexual conduct
outside the institution of marriage. Marriage is the foundation of family and society. Its
stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and this state.").
14. See generally Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the Marital
Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L.R. 1 (2000).
15. See In re the Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 213 n.17 (Wis. 1991), overruled on
other grounds by In re H.S.H-K, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
16. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
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to governmental regulation as long as the regulation is not unduly
burdensome and is substantially related to an important governmental
interest.'7 Under the auspices of federalism, the regulation of marriage has
been relegated exclusively to state governments. 8 Therefore, states may
decide for themselves whether to permit same-sex marriages to be validly
performed and enforced within their own borders. The federal government,
however, recently passed the Defense of Marriage Act in order to define
the term "marriage" for the purpose of determining the meaning of federal
statutes and regulations 9 and to provide that states are not required to give
effect to same-sex marriages contracted or solemnized in other states."
The latter provision was included to counteract the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution,2' which requires states to
recognize marriages validly performed in other states. For example, if
State A allows sixteen-year-olds to marry and State B does not, then
sixteen-year-olds who marry each other in State A and subsequently move
to State B have a constitutional right to have their marriage enforced in
State B, thus enjoying all the benefits granted to married couples in State
B. ADOPTION
Consistent with other areas of family law, adoption statutes are
promulgated by state legislatures in accordance with public policy
considerations that often include providing for the best interests of the
child, achieving finality in the placement of children and promoting
stability in family relationships.' Unlike marriage, however, there is no
fundamental right to adopt.24 Therefore, states may put restrictions on who
may adopt, as well as who may be adopted, so long as the restrictions are
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, such as the best interests of
the child.25
Adoption procedures in Wisconsin, like many other states, require both
374, 383 (1978).
17. See.Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
18. See generally Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
19. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
21. U.S. CoNST. art. 4, § 1.
22. See generally Cox, supra note 2, at 1062-99.
23. See Wis. STAT. § 48.01(2) (2000). It states:
The best interests of the child shall always be of paramount consideration,
but the court shall also consider the interest of the parents or guardian of the
child, the interest of the person or persons with whom the child has been
placed for adoption and the interests of the public.
Id.
24. See Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 132 (7th Cir. 1989).
25. See Heather J. Langemak, The "Best Interest of the Child": Is a Categorical Ban on
Homosexual Adoption an Appropriate Means to This End?, 83 MARQ. L. REv. 825, 835-36
(2000).
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statutory and judicial approval.2 6 Adoptions are handled on a case-by-case
basis and are not considered final until approved through a judicial hearing.
The petition for adoption must set forth the statutory requirements: (1) the
person being adopted is "competent" or qualified to be adopted according
to state law; 2" (2) the person adopting is competent to adopt under state
law28 and (3) the parental rights of the previous parent or parents have been
terminated. 9 At the hearing, the statutory requirements must be met before
the court will turn to the ultimate issue of whether the adoption is in the
best interest of the child. °
The "best interests" standard is inexact. The adopting parent has the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the adoption is, in
fact, in the best interest of the child. The court may take any number of
factors into consideration under the "best interest" standard, such as the
child's wishes, the environment of the adopting parent and the mental and
physical health of the parent and child. No single factor is determinative,
and no pre-assigned weight is accorded to the numerous factors.'
C. CUSTODY AND VISITATION
Custody encompasses a parent's right to make decisions regarding a
child's care, control, education, health and religion in the absence of
involvement by the court, unless there is danger to the child's physical
health or emotional development.2 Courts often apply a "parental
preference standard," which presumes that custody by a natural parent is in
the best interest of the child.33  Under the theory of in loco parentis,
3
however, custody may be awarded to a third party or "stranger" if both
parents are deemed to be unfit. Nevertheless, even though a parent is fit to
have custody, the parent may be denied custody if a court determines that
the best interests of the child are not met.
26. See In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Wis. 1994) (quoting
Emily C. Patt, Second Parent Adoption: When Crossing the Marital Barrier Is in the Child's
Best Interests, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 96, 111 (1987-88) ("Before a court may make a
finding that a second parent adoption is in a child's best interests, it must determine whether
it has the power to grant such an adoption under the existing adoption statutes.")).
27. See Wis. STAT. § 48.81 (2000).
28. See Wis. STAT. § 48.82 (2000).
29. See Wis. STAT. § 48.81(1) (2000).
30. See Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 681.
31. See 2 AM. JUR. 2DAdoption § 137 (2000).
32. See UNIF. MARRIAGE& DIVORCEACT § 408(a), 4 U.L.A. 1 (1973).
33. See In re the Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Wis. 1991), overruled on other
grounds by In re H.S.H-K, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995); Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d
479, 488 (Wis. 1984).
34. "In loco parentis" is defined as "[i]n the place of a parent; instead of a parent;
charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 542 (7th ed. 1999).
35. See Petition of Hohmann, 95 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1959). But see Barstad, 348
N.W.2d at 489 (requiring a finding of parental unfitness before granting custody to a third
party).
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Where the custody of a child is awarded to a parent subsequent to
divorce, the non-custodial parent should be granted liberal visitation rights,
absent extraordinary circumstances, such as sexual abuse.36 Courts stress
the importance of the parent-child relationship by preserving visitation
rights whenever possible to avoid estrangement of parent and child;
however, the needs of children in custody and visitation cases are
paramount, while the desires of parents are secondary. 7 In Wisconsin,
petitions for visitation will not be considered absent an underlying action
affecting the family, such as divorce. 8
Finally, courts may enforce express or implied contracts for custody or
visitation as long as the contract does not violate public policy.39
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: "A promise affecting the right of
custody of a minor child is unenforceable on grounds of public policy
unless the disposition as to custody is consistent with the best interest of the
child."'4 Likewise, courts may find an implied contract for custody or
visitation under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which grants the party
seeking custody or visitation standing as an "equitable parent."'
Essentially, equitable estoppel is used to prevent a natural or adoptive
parent from denying that the party seeking custody or visitation is a parent
to the child.
II. THE CASES
A. INRE THE INTEREST OFZ.J.H.42
Wendy Sporleder and Janice Hermes were in a committed lesbian
relationship for eight years. The couple had attempted to start a family
through the artificial insemination of Wendy, but the attempt was
36. See Hanke v. Hanke, 615 A.2d 1205 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
37. See Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
38. See ZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d at 209-11; Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 415 N.W.2d 571, 573-
74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). In Van Cleve, the maternal grandmother filed a petition for
visitation with her two grandchildren after being previously denied informal visitation by
her daughter and son-in-law, the children's parents. 415 N.W.2d. at 572. The petition was
denied because the court determined that there was no underlying action affecting the
family, such as divorce, which would justify a court's granting visitation to a third party.
See id. at 574. The court stated:
It is appropriate for the state to protect the children's best interests by ordering
visitation with appropriate adults to mitigate the trauma and impact of a dissolving
family relationship. In the absence of such factors, however, there is no justifiable
reason for the state to override determinations made by parents as to what is in the
best interests of their children.
Id.
39. See Melisa G. Thompson, Note, In re Interest of Z.J.H.: Are Two Moms too Many?,
42 DEPAuL L. REv. 1125, 1142-45 (1993).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (1995).
41. See Thompson, supra note 39, at 1145-48.
42. 471 N.W.2d 202.
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unsuccessful. Thereafter, they decided that Janice would adopt a child.
Z.J.H. was placed in the couple's home in March 1988 as part of the pre-
adoption placement by an adoption agency. Wendy was the primary
caretaker and Janice worked outside the home.
Wendy and Janice separated in October 1988. Shortly thereafter,
Wendy and Janice entered a co-parenting agreement, in which they agreed
that they would determine the physical placement of Z.J.H. through
mediation, and that the non-placement party would have reasonable and
liberal visitation rights. 3 The separation was far from amicable. Janice
contended that the co-parenting agreement was invalid, claiming that she
signed the agreement under duress caused by Wendy's threats to interfere
with her adoption of Z.J.H. Janice formally adopted Z.J.H. in November
1988 and prohibited Wendy from seeing the child.
Wendy brought an action in family court seeking visitation rights or
physical custody of Z.J.H. and enforcement of the co-parenting
agreement." The family court commissioner granted visitation rights to
Wendy and deferred the remaining issues to the circuit court. The circuit
court granted summary judgment for Janice on the grounds that (1) Wendy
did not enjoy the legal status of parent and (2) Wendy had no standing to
request custody or visitation of Z.J.H. because there was no underlying
action affecting the family." The circuit court also determined that the co-
parenting agreement was void as against public policy, 46 and that Janice
was not equitably estopped from denying Wendy's status as a parent.4 ' The
court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court, and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review.48
1. Custody
The first issue before the court was whether Wendy, who was not a
natural or adoptive parent of Z.J.H., was entitled to custody or physical
placement of Z.J.H. under the doctrine of in loco parentis.4 9 The court
concluded that a non-parent, such as Wendy, "may not bring an action to
obtain custody of a minor child unless the natural or adoptive parent is unfit
or unable to care for the child, or there are compelling reasons for awarding
custody to a third party."5 Wendy conceded that Janice was "not unfit or
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 203-05 (citing Van Cleve, 415 N.W.2d 571).
46. See Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 211-12.
47. See id. at 212-13.
48. See id. at 203-04.
49. See id. at 206-09. Wendy did not have the option to jointly adopt Z.J.H. under
Wisconsin law. See id. at 209 n. 11; see also In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d
678 (Wis. 1994); In re the Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,437 n.41 (Wis. 1995).
50. Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d at 205 (citing Barstad v. Frasier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 489 (Wis.
1984)). Barstad concerned a dispute between a mother and grandmother for custody of a
ten-year-old boy. 348 N.W.2d at 481. The grandmother maintained a stable home
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incapable of taking care of Z.J.H. ''5' The court also found that there were
no compelling reasons or other extraordinary circumstances that would
compel the court to grant custody to Wendy, despite Wendy's assertions
that her primary caregiver status and parent-like relationship with Z.J.H.
were compelling reasons. 2 The court stated that "[clompelling reasons
include abandonment, persistent neglect of parental responsibilities,
extended disruption of parental custody, or other similar extraordinary
circumstances that would drastically affect the welfare of the child."53
In traditional custody cases, courts apply the "parental preference
standard," which gives great deference to the right of biological or adoptive
parents to raise their children as they see fit.' Therefore, the bar for a non-
parent same-sex partner seeking custody is much higher than that for a
legally recognized spouse, because the partner is, in the courts' eyes, a
mere third party instead of a parent.55 The court's definition of "compelling
reasons" demonstrates the higher bar. The non-parent partner must prove
that the parent is unfit in order to get custody of the child,57 ostensibly
terminating the unfit parent's rights. Custody, however, is not necessarily
about terminating parental rights.58 Justice Steinmetz argued in his dissent
to Barstad v. Frazier that the primary test for custody had always been and
should continue to be the best interests of the child and not parental
unfitness.59 His reasoning allowed for the possibility that there may be
"compelling factors" other than parental unfitness that would warrant
environment for the boy for the majority of his life. See id. at 481-82. The mother changed
residences constantly and visited her son regularly. See id. Although the lower courts
granted custody to the grandmother, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, requiring a
showing of parental unfitness before a court could grant custody to a non-parent. See id. at
481, 489-90. Justice Steinmetz wrote a lengthy dissent in which he strenuously argued that
the "best interest of the child" standard should have been the paramount consideration, and
that parental unfitness should not be a requirement in custody cases. Id. at 492-98
(Steinmetz, J., dissenting). Justice Steinmetz stated:
The trial court should not be required to find the parent unfit before
considering the best interests of the child since that is not in the child's best
interest. If the parent is found by a court to be unfit, his or her parental
rights should be terminated. If the parent is not unfit, he or she still may not
be the person to have custody of the child when considering the child's best
interest.
Id. at 492 (Justice Steinmetz, dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Steinmetz abandoned this
argument when he joined the majority reasoning in ZJ.H. in denying Wendy custody in part
on the basis that Janice was not found to be unfit. 471 N.W.2d at 205.
51. ZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d at 205.
52. See id. at 205-06.
53. Id. at 205 (citing Barstad, 348 N.W.2d at 489).
54. See Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 415 N.W.2d 543, 573-74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987);
Barstad, 348 N.W.2d at 489.
55. See ZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d at 204, 209-12.
56. See id. at 205.
57. See id. at 206.
58. See Barstad, 348 N.W.2d at 497 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 497-98 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting); see also supra note 50.
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granting custody to a non-parent.60 His reasoning in Barstad ultimately
supports Wendy's argument for custody. Extrapolating the logic Justice
Steinmetz employed in his Barstad dissent, the court should have
considered the best interests of Z.J.H. instead of focusing on Janice's
fitness as a parent.6' Nevertheless, the court would not consider either
Wendy's position as the primary caregiver in a same-sex relationship or her
parent-like status to be compelling reasons.62  Inexplicably, Justice
Steinmetz agreed.63
Wendy argued that she had status as a parent under the theory of in
loco parentis. 6' The court summarily rejected her argument.6 ' Again, the
court refused to consider the surrounding circumstances of the adoption
and the relationship between Wendy and Janice. 6  The court denied
Wendy's strongest claim of parental status, stating that "[w]ere we to
permit individuals standing in loco parentis to obtain custody, as [Wendy]
urges us to do, we would open the doors to multiple parties claiming
custody of children by virtue of their in loco parentis status." 67 The court
postulated that housekeepers and daycare providers might try to claim in
loco parentis status.66 Such examples show the court's failure to understand
that Wendy was distinguishable from a housekeeper or daycare provider.
Wendy was a legitimate member of a nontraditional family, as opposed to
hired help.
One way to resolve the court's concern about claims from multiple
parties is to legalize same-sex marriages. If Wendy and Janice had been
married, the marriage would have legitimized Wendy's parental
relationship with Z.J.H.,69 unlike a child's relationship with a housekeeper
or daycare provider. Thus, the theory of in loco parentis could be limited
in custody cases to those individuals who were married to the natural or
adoptive parent while forming a parental relationship with the child with
whom they now seek custody. Alternatively, if same-sex marriages were
legal, Wendy and Janice could have adopted Z.J.H. jointly so that Wendy
would not even have to resort to the in loco parentis doctrine. 70 Thus, in
loco parentis could remain inapplicable to custody actions, and the
"housekeeper problem" would be resolved.
Another way to resolve the court's concerns about multiple parties
60. See Barstad, 348 N.W.2d at 495-98 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
61. See In re the Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 205-06 (Wis. 1991).
62. See id. at 205-06.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 204, 206.
65. See id. at 206-09.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 208 (italics in original).
68. See id. at 208 n. 10.
69. See id. at 209 n. 11.
70. See id.
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claiming custody is to recognize the right of same-sex partners to contract
with one another, either expressly or implicitly, concerning the custody of
the child.7' Given that same-sex couples do not have the option to marry,
courts could provide equal protection to same-sex couples who dissolve
their relationships and seek custody of a child by, for example, allowing
evidence of a prior committed relationship, a verbal or written agreement
concerning the care of the child, consolidated funds and so forth. Such
evidence would eliminate unsubstantiated claims for custody by third
parties.
Extending the in loco parentis doctrine to same-sex couples in these
ways need not lead to absurd results. First, heterosexual unmarried couples
should not be allowed to use the doctrine under the reasoning that the
option to marry, with its attendant legal protections, was open to them and
they failed to exercise that right. Second, individuals such as housekeepers
and daycare providers would presumably be excluded under this test,
because one could easily prove that the housekeeper or daycare provider
was merely an employee and not a committed partner of the parent.
2. Visitation
The second issue before the court was whether the Wisconsin family
law statutes entitled Wendy to visitation rights with Z.J.H. absent an
"underlying action affecting the family."'72 The court rejected Wendy's
request for visitation with Z.J.H., despite the plain meaning of Wisconsin
Statute section 767.245(1), which provides:
Visitation rights of certain persons. (1) Upon petition by a
grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with
the child, the court may grant reasonable visitation rights to that
person if the parents have notice of the hearing and if the court
determines that visitation is in the best interest of the child. 3
The court held that "[w]hile this section does not specifically preclude
such an action by a third party, a review of our case law leads to the
inescapable conclusion that there must be an underlying action affecting
the family unit before the provisions of sec. 767.245(1) are implicated."'74
The threshold requirement of an action affecting the family includes
actions such as divorce or custody.75 The court found that there was no
underlying action affecting the family in this case because there was no
71. See, e.g., id. at 204, 212-13; Thompson, supra note 39, at 1142-45.
72. ZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d at 209.
73. Id. at 209 n.12.
74. Id. at 209.
75. See id. at 209-10.
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divorce, annulment or legal separation.76 In support of its finding, the court
stated, "It is obvious from these analyses that the legislature did not intend
that the state intervene in the parents' decision regarding their children's
best interests when the family unit is intact. 77 Thus, the court found that
the family unit of Janice and Z.J.H. was intact, and therefore impervious to
a request for visitation by Wendy, a third party.
The majority's holding on this issue is vehemently opposed in the
dissent from Justice Bablitch.78 Bablitch aptly stated:
The underlying rationale of Van Cleve, which cannot be disputed,
is that children of a dissolving relationship need and deserve the
protection of the court lest they become mere pawns in the conflict
between the parents. As the majority recognizes, "ordering
visitation with non-parents may help to mitigate the trauma and
impact of a dissolving family relationship." Why that rationale
does not apply equally to the children of a dissolving non-
79traditional relationship escapes me.
The majority stated that Wendy was "miss[ing] the point" when she
claimed that Janice and Z.J.H. did not represent an intact family80
However, it is the author's opinion that the majority missed the point. The
Justices refused to recognize that a same-sex couple and their child
represent an intact family and that the dissolution of that family unit,
whether or not it fits neatly into the legal definition of an underlying action
affecting the family, is devastating for the parents and child.8 Rather than
focus on who makes up a legally "intact family" for the purposes of
determining visitation,' 2 the court should, as Bablitch suggests, focus upon
the best interests of the child.83
With the holding on this issue, the court missed a rare opportunity to
make an allowance for the children of non-traditional relationships. The
court could have distinguished the holding in Van Cleve and determined
instead that the dissolution of a same-sex relationship satisfies the threshold
requirement that there be an underlying action affecting the family before
visitation rights will be determined pursuant to section 767.245(1).
76. See id. at 209-11.
77. Id. at 210 (citing Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 415 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987)).
78. See id. at 214-15 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 215 (Bablitch, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 210.
81. See id. at 209 (referring to "the suffering of a child such as Z.J.H. may endure as a
result of his separation from [Wendy]" as an "unfortunate situation" (quoting Nancy S. v.
Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)).
82. See id. 210.
83. See id. at 215 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
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3. Contract
The third issue before the court was whether a co-parenting agreement
between Wendy and Janice was enforceable by the courts when it
concerned the physical placement of Z.J.H. or visitation rights with Z.J.H.4
The court concluded that "rights to custody and visitation are controlled by
statutory and case law, and cannot be contracted away" and held that "the
contract is void to the extent it purports to award custody or grant visitation
rights to Wendy."' According to the court, the contract is invalid as
contrary to public policy, because there is a "public interest in maintaining
a stable relationship between a child and his or her legal parent."86 Because
the contract in this case allowed for the possibility that Z.J.H. would be
placed with Wendy, a third party, instead of Janice, the adoptive parent, it
was "inconsistent with legislative intent behind the custody and visitation
statutes, which prefer parents over third parties."
Justice Abrahamson strenuously opposed this reasoning.8 As she
stated:
Numerous contracts exist for the care and financial support of
children .... Although statutes govern visitation and support of
children under certain circumstances, the statutes do not expressly
or impliedly bar parents from entering into agreements about the
physical placement, care and financial support of a child that
protect the best interests of the child.'
Justice Abrahamson also pointed out that the majority neglected to
employ the balancing test for contracts that purportedly violate public
policy:
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is
taken of
(a) the parties' justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied,
and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the
particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term,
84. See id. at211.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 212.
87. Id. at211.
88. See id. at 213-14 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 213 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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account is taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or
judicial decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further
that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to
which it was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct
and the term.'
Justice Abrahamson further noted that in analyzing an agreement
affecting the right of custody of a minor, section 191 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts states that the agreement "is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy unless the disposition as to custody is consistent
with the best interests of the child."9'
Although the Restatement is not dispositive on the issue of whether the
co-parenting agreement is valid, the Restatement entertains the idea that
such an agreement could be valid if the agreement's provisions were to be
in the child's best interests.92 The court, however, never conducted a
balancing test to assess whether the agreement was contrary to public
policy or in the best interest of the child. The court decided this issue on a
motion for summary judgement based solely on the statutory and case law
that prefers parents retain custody over third parties. According to Justice
Abrahamson, the court should have remanded the case for a hearing, and
"the circuit court should consider such public policies as protection of
freedom of contract, protection against impairment of family relations, and
the best interests of the child in determining whether any part of the
agreement affecting the child should be enforced." 94
4. Estoppel
The final issue addressed by the court was whether Janice was
equitably estopped from denying that Wendy was an equitable parent of
Z.J.H., and therefore entitled to custody or visitation.95 On this issue, the
court held Janice was not equitably estopped from denying that Wendy is a
90. See id.
91. Id. at 214 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 191 (1979)).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 211.
94. Id. at 211.
95. See id. at 212.
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parent of Z.J.H. because "[t]he effect of an estoppel in pais is to prevent the
assertion of what would otherwise be an unequivocal right.... Such an
estoppel operates always as a shield, never as a sword.... [A]nd it does
not of itself create new rights."96 In doing so, the court distinguished this
case from several previous cases where the status of "equitable parent"
applied to husbands whose wives bore children fathered by another man.9"
In relation to these cases, the court's reasoning appears to be sound. The
husbands were entitled to the status of equitable parent because they had
helped to raise the children as their own,9" assuming during that time that
they were the natural fathers." In at least one case, the husband discovered
the truth after the relationship with the wife had dissolved.' °°
While it is true that "[e]quitable estoppel has not been invoked in
Wisconsin against a natural/adoptive parent for the purpose of awarding
custody to a non-parent," it is also true that equitable estoppel has been
invoked in Wisconsin against a natural parent for the purpose of awarding
visitation to a non-parent.'0 ' The court distinguished the current case
because (1) the husband in the prior case had the status of "natural parent"
until the results of a court-ordered blood test proved otherwise' 2 (whereas
Wendy never had the status of "natural parent"' 03), and (2) the child in the
prior case was born into an existing marriage."4 The court essentially
conceded that Wendy did assume parent-like responsibilities with Z.J.H.,
but nevertheless assumed that Wendy could never have believed, like the
husbands in D.LJ. and R.R.J., that she had the legal status of a parent.
The court chose to ignore the fact that Wendy did have an expectation of
legal status as a parent, based on the co-parenting agreement,' °6 as well as
her failed attempt at artificial insemination prior to the adoption. 7
Furthermore, the marriage distinction between the cases undeniably adds
insult to Wendy's injury. This distinction is one that is patently unfair,
given that same-sex couples simply do not have the option of gaining
certain legal protections through a state-recognized marriage.
96. Id. (quoting 19 AM. JuR. Estoppel § 40 (1939)).
97. See In re Paternity of D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d 283 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage
of A.J.N. v. J.M.N., 414 N.W.2d 68 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of L.M.S. v.
S.L.S., 312 N.W.2d 853 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
98. See D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d at 284,287-88; L.M.S., 312 N.W.2d at 854-55.
99. See, e.g., A.J.N., 414 N.W.2d at 69.
100. See In re Marriage of D.L.J. and R.R.J., 469 N.W.2d 877 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
101. ZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d at 212 (citing D.L.J., 469 N.W.2d at 877) (emphasis added).
102. See D.LJ., 469 N.W.2d at 878.
103. See ZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d at 204-09.
104. See id. at 213 n.17.
105. See id. at 213.
106. See id. at 204, 211.
107. See id. at 204.
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B. IN THE INTEREST OF ANGEL LACE M.' 08
Angel was born on March 10, 1986.' 9 Georgina and Terry, a married
heterosexual couple, adopted Angel on September 20, 1988. ' The couple
divorced in June 1990, after which Terry paid court-ordered child support
but was not otherwise involved in Angel's life."' In June 1990, Georgina
and Angel began living with Annette, Georgina's partner. ' 2 In August
1991, Georgina and Annette had a marriage-like ceremony in Milwaukee"'
to symbolize their commitment to one another.
In February 1992, Annette filed a petition to adopt Angel, while
Georgina simultaneously filed a petition to terminate Terry's parental rights
and a petition for the adoptive placement of Angel with Annette. ' 14 During
a hearing on the petitions, Terry consented to the termination of his
parental rights.' In addition, a social worker testified that the adoption of
Angel by Annette would be in Angel's best interests."6 Although the
county circuit court determined that the proposed adoption was in Angel's
best interests, it denied the adoption petition because, pursuant to chapter
48 of the Wisconsin Statute, Annette was not competent to adopt Angel and
Angel was not competent to be adopted by Annette."' On review, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court by a vote
of six to three."'
1. Wisconsin Adoption Statutes
The court first addressed the issue of whether the Wisconsin adoption
statutes permit a third party to adopt the minor child of the third party's
nonmarital partner." 9 In determining that the Wisconsin adoption statutes
do not permit such an adoption, the court first rejected Georgina and
Annette's contention that the adoption should be granted because the
circuit court found the adoption to be in the best interests of the child,
pursuant to section 48.01(2):
This chapter shall be liberally construed to effect the objectives
contained in this section. The best interests of the child shall
always be of paramount consideration, but the court shall also
consider the interest of the parents or guardian of the child, the
108. 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
109. See id. at 680.
110. Seeid.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Seeid. atn.1.
114. Seeid.
115. Seeid.
116. See id. at 680-81.
117. See id. at 681.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 681-82.
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interest of the person or persons with whom the child has been
placed for adoption and the interests of the public."
The court rejected the argument because such a broad reading of this
statute would render other portions of the adoption statutes surplusage, or
unnecessary.' Therefore, the court sought to make a threshold
determination of whether the proposed adoption satisfied the statutory
requirements for adoption, before inquiring into the best interests of the
child.'"
Section 48.82 sets forth who may adopt a child legally:
(1) The following persons are eligible to adopt a minor if they are
residents of this state:
(a) A husband and wife jointly, or either the husband or wife if
the other spouse is a parent of the minor.
(b) An unmarried adult. 3
Furthermore, the child must also be eligible for adoption under section
48.81:
Any minor who meets all of the following criteria may be adopted:
(1) [A] minor whose parental rights have been terminated under
subch[apter] VIII or in another state or a foreign jurisdiction.
(2) A minor who is present within this state at the time the petition
for adoption is filed.'24
The court found that Annette met the requirements for adopting Angel,
because Annette was a resident of Wisconsin and an unmarried adult.'"
Angel, however, was not eligible to be adopted, because the court
interpreted section 48.81(1) to mean that the parental rights of both parents
must be terminated before the child is eligible for adoption.'26 Georgina's
parental rights were intact.' 27
Georgina and Annette argued that section 48.81(1) is ambiguous and
120. Id. at 681 n.3.
121. Seeid.at681.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 682 n.4. Interestingly, this section further provides: "(6) No otherwise
qualified person may be denied the benefits of this subchapter because of his or her race,
color, ancestry or national origin." Id.
124. Id. at n.5. The court noted that the legislature must have meant "parents' rights"
instead of "parental rights" because a child does not have parental rights. Id. at n.6.
125. See id. at 682.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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could be construed to mean either (1) that the rights of both parents have
been terminated or (2) that the rights of at least one of the parents have
been terminated.' 2' Georgina and Annette urged the court to adopt the
second interpretation in order to further the best interests of Angel,
pursuant to section 48.01(2).
In rejecting their argument, the court proceeded with its own statutory
interpretation, which lacked an analysis of legislative history despite the
court's earlier admonition that "'[a]doption proceedings, unknown at
common law, are of statutory origin... ,,,I29 The court based its
interpretation completely on case law and concocted extreme examples to
which the response was, "The legislature could not have intended...
[such] an absurd result."'3° For example, in response to Georgina and
Annette's interpretation of section 48.81(1) the court stated:
Under this second interpretation of the statute-that a minor is
eligible for adoption as long as the rights of at least one of her
parents have been terminated-a minor would be eligible for
adoption when the rights of only one of her parents are terminated.
The minor would be eligible to be adopted even if the remaining
parent is legally fit to raise the child alone and prefers to raise the
child alone. Ostensibly, a complete stranger could petition to adopt
a minor who is a member of this stable family; and, at least
pursuant to sec. 48.81, Stats., the proposed adoption would be
permissible.'3 '
The court further stated that "such an adoption may be prohibited by
other provisions in the adoption statutes[; h]owever, this particular section
should not be interpreted to allow this absurd result."'32 Such examples are
not only inflammatory and erroneous, but they are betrayed by the court's
own reasoning in the very next footnote allowing an exception for
stepparent adoptions:
This holding obviously does not apply to stepparent adoptions. In
a stepparent adoption, the minor is eligible to be adopted if the
rights of one of her parents are terminated. Section 48.81, Stats.,
does not clearly provide for this exception in the case of stepparent
adoptions. However, it is clear from surrounding statutes that the
legislature intended to sanction stepparent adoptions.'
Thus, the court allowed an exception to its own interpretation of
128. See id.
129. Id. at 681 (citing Estate of Topel, 145 N.W.2d 162 (Wis. 1966)).
130. Id. at 682.
131. Id. (italics in original).
132. Id. at 683 n.7.
133. Id. at n.8 (citing Wis. STAT. §§ 48.92(2), 48.835(3)(b) (2000)).
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section 48.81(1) for stepparent adoptions by looking to other statutes to
further legislative intent, yet the court refused to allow an exception for a
lesbian couple because it believed this would lead to absurd results like
stranger adoption." The court failed to acknowledge the possibility that if
a child is allowed by statute to be adopted by a stepparent when the rights
of only one parent have been terminated, it may be possible to interpret
section 48.81(1) in the manner Annette suggested. That is to say, the right
of a child to be adopted by a stepparent (without the termination of rights
of both parents) is not an exception to the rule (as the court interpreted it),
but actually reflects the rule intended by the Legislature. 35 If the court had
been willing to benefit same-sex partners the way that it benefits
stepparents, the court could have followed Justice Heffernan's suggestion
io look to section 48.01(2) to allow "liberal construction of the statute with
the paramount consideration being the child's best interests," because none
of the other interests considered within that section preclude liberal
construction.36 Justice Heffernan's suggestion easily did away with the
majority's extreme examples, because a stranger's attempt to adopt a child
would be precluded by the interests of either the natural parents, the
adoptive parents or the public under section 48.01(2)."'
Finally, the court reasoned that, even if Annette was permitted to adopt
Angel pursuant to Annette's interpretation of section 48.81 (1), the adoption
would effectively cut off the parental rights of Georgina pursuant to section
48.92(2), which states:
After the order of adoption is entered the relationship of parent and
child between the adopted person and the adoptive person's birth
parents, unless the birth parent is the spouse of the adoptive parent,
shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties and other legal
consequences of the relationship shall cease to exist.'
The court noted that, in this case, references in the statute to "parent"
and "birth parent" are to the adoptive parent (Georgina).'39 The court
proceeded to pour salt in the proverbial wound by pointing out, "The
statute does exempt the birth parent from this 'cut-off provision in
stepparent adoptions. However, because Georgina and Annette are not
married, this exception does not apply.""4" By this statement, the court
expressed the latent issue in the case-Wisconsin's prohibition against
same-sex marriage.
134. See id. at 682.
135. See id. at 683 n.8.
136. Id. at 689 (Heffernan, C. J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 683 n.9 (emphasis added) (citing Wis. STAT. § 48.92(2) (2000)).
139. Id. at 683 n.10 (citing Wis. STAT. § 48.96 (2000)).
140. Id. atn.11.
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Nevertheless, Georgina and Annette argued that section 48.92(2) was
directory rather than mandatory, despite use of the word "shall."' 4' The
court convincingly rejected the argument by stating that "'shall' is
presumed to be mandatory when it appears in a statute"' ' 12 and that
"petitioners' argument does not overcome this presumption.' 43 In addition,
"where the legislature specifically enumerates certain exceptions to a
statute, this court presumes that the legislature intended to exclude other
exceptions based on the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (i.e., the
specification of one exception to a general rule assumes that other
exceptions are excluded).'" Thus, the exception for stepparent adoptions
has the effect of excluding other possible exceptions to the rule. Although
the court's reasoning was sufficiently sound on this issue, the court
nevertheless went on to give another inflammatory example of how reading
the statute as petitioners argued would lead to absurd results. 45 Such an
example takes away from the force of the court's legitimate argument and
further inflames the debate over same-sex marriage.
The counterargument by Chief Justice Heffernan was equally forceful.
Justice Heffernan's argument is as follows: (1) "'Shall' will be construed as
directory if necessary to carry out the intent of the legislature";'46 (2) The
intent of the legislature in promulgating the adoption statutes was to further
the best interests of the child4 7 and (3) Construction of "shall" in section
48.92(2) as directory rather than mandatory comports with the legislative
intent.'48 Justice Heffeman also pointed out that two other state supreme
courts facing the same issue both determined that the cut-off provisions
were to be interpreted as directory rather than mandatory in order to further
the best interests of the child.
149
Again, the court simply refused to recognize the validity of the
committed relationship between two women wishing to share in the legal
responsibilities for a child, presumably fearing that recognition would serve
to sanction a relationship of which the majority on the court disapproves.
2. Constitutional Challenge
The court next addressed whether the Wisconsin adoption statutes
violate the constitutional rights of either Annette or Angel.'" Georgina and
141. Id. at 683.
142. Id. (quoting State v. Speer, 501 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. 1993) (citing American Fam. Ins.
Co. v. Milwaukee, 435 N.W.2d 280 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988))).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 683-84 (citing State ex rel. Harris v. Jordan, 219 N.W.2d 335 (Wis. 1974)).
145. See id. at 684.
146. Id. at 683 (quoting State v. R.R.E., 470 N.W.2d 283 (Wis. 1991)).
147. See id. at 688 (Hefferman, C.J., dissenting) (citing Wis. STAT. § 48.01(2) (2000)).
148. Seeid. at691.
149. See id. at 692 (citing Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt.
1993); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993)).
150. See id. at 685-86.
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Annette's constitutional arguments received much less attention from the
court. The best constitutional argument presented on their behalf was that
of the American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation ("ACLU")
as amicus curiae. The ACLU argued that "Wisconsin's legislative adoption
scheme violates Annette's right to equal protection by discriminating
against her on the basis of her sexual orientation and/or her gender."' 5' In
rejecting the argument, the court responded, "Annette may not adopt Angel
because Annette and Georgina are not married. Any legitimate argument
the ACLU may have should be directed at Wisconsin's prohibition of
same-sex marriages, not the adoption statutes."'52
The crux of the matter is that Wisconsin prohibits same-sex marriages,
which in turn has ramifications on the legal relationships between same-sex
couples and their children. Although Chief Justice Heffernan did not
directly address the constitutional issues in his dissent, he did point out the
plight of same-sex couples with children:
Annette, who is already Angel's defacto parent, will not have the
right nor the obligation to maintain their relationship were
Georgina to die or become incompetent or were Annette and
Georgina to separate. This court has already closed three avenues
that Angel and Annette could have used to obtain legal rights to a
continued relationship in the event Annette and Georgina were to
separate-the right to seek custody is closed, the right to seek
visitation is closed and the option of protecting the relationship
through contract is closed.... [T]his court should not close the
door on her adoption.'53
The court's approach to same-sex couples with children is biased. The
court has systematically deprived same-sex couples of the right to protect
their children through legally-recognized relationships, which stems from
the prohibition of same-sex marriage, which in turn stems from
discrimination against homosexuals, which the state of Wisconsin has
recognized and explicitly prohibited in other areas of the law."M
C. INRE CUSTODY OFH.S.H.-K1
55
Sandra Lynne Holtzman and Elsbeth Knott met in February 1983. '56 In
October 1983, they jointly purchased a home and began living together. In
September 1984, they solemnized their commitment to each other in a
private marriage-like ceremony. They decided to start a family and agreed
151. Id. at686.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 694 (citing In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991) (italics in
original)).
154. See supra notes 2-11.
155. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
156. See id. at421.
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that Elsbeth would be artificially inseminated with sperm from an
anonymous donor. After at least one failed attempt, Elsbeth became
pregnant in March 1988.17
During the pregnancy, Sandra attended obstetrical visits and childbirth
classes with Elsbeth and was present during the labor and delivery. After
the child was born on December 15, 1988, Sandra took three weeks off of
work to care for Elsbeth and the child. 58 Sandra and Elsbeth chose the
baby's name together, using first and middle names from each of their
families and a surname, which combined their last names (Holtzman-
Knott).' 59 At the dedication ceremony held at the couple's church, both
women were named as the child's parents, and Sandra's sister was named
the child's godmother.
From the date of the child's birth until the couple separated in January
1993, Sandra provided the primary financial support for the family and
shared in the childcare responsibilities. The couple explained to the child
that there are many kinds of families, and that he had two parents who
loved him very much. The child referred to Sandra as "My San." Every
Father's Day, the family celebrated their own special holiday honoring
Sandra.
Sandra claimed that in the fall of 1992, she noticed a change in
Elsbeth's behavior. Sandra felt that Elsbeth suffered from depression and
asserted that Elsbeth's care for the child deteriorated as a result. In January
1993, Elsbeth ended the relationship with Sandra, but the two women
agreed to live together for the child's sake. In May 1993, Elsbeth moved
out of the house with the child. Thereafter, Sandra maintained contact with
the child and spent as much time with him as Elsbeth would allow. On
August 24, 1994, Elsbeth terminated Sandra's relationship with the child.
On August 26, 1994, Elsbeth petitioned for a restraining order against
Sandra, claiming that she had threatened or intimidated her. The petition
was dismissed when Sandra agreed not to contact Elsbeth, and a guardian
ad litem was appointed for the child.IW In September, Sandra filed separate
petitions for custody and visitation, and Elsbeth filed a motion for summary
judgment. Despite the guardian ad litem's report that the child believed
Sandra was his parent, and that he would like to see, spend time with and
telephone Sandra, the circuit court granted Elsbeth's motion for summary
judgment. In doing so, however, the circuit court urged the Wisconsin
judiciary and legislature to reexamine the law in light of the realities of
modern society and the best interest of the children:
The court sees this as a case where a family member ought to have
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 422.
160. See id.
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the right to visit and keep an eye on the welfare of a minor child
with whom she has developed a parent-like relationship.
Unfortunately because the law does not recognize the alternative
type of relationship which existed in this case, this court can not
offer the relief [Sandra] Holtzman seeks.
There are an increasing number of children in this society for
whom the mother is the only known biological parent. Frequently
that mother forms a lengthy relationship living with another
person, be they man or woman, who assumes a parental role in the
child's life for many years. Why should such children be denied
the love, guidance and nurturing of the parental bond which
developed simply because the adults cannot maintain their
relationship? Lack of love and guidance in the lives of children is
a major problem in our society. Does it make sense for the law to
worsen this sad fact by denying a child contact with one they have
come to accept as their parent, especially when it clearly appears to
be in the best interest of the child?
1 61
1. Custody
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first addressed whether Sandra's
assertions of Elsbeth's parental unfitness and inability to care for the child,
or of compelling circumstances requiring a change of custody, were
sufficient to proceed on a petition for custody.62 The court rejected
Sandra's action for custody by reiterating the holding of In re Interest of
Z.J.H.: "A person who is not a biological or adoptive parent may not bring
an action to obtain custody of a minor unless the biological or adoptive
parent is 'unfit or unable to care for the child' or there are compelling
reasons for awarding custody to a nonparent."'63 The court found that no
triable issue of fact regarding Elsbeth's fitness or ability to care for the
child was presented."
161. Id. at422-23.
162. See id. at423.
163. Id. (citing In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Wis. 1991); Barstad v.
Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479,489 (Wis. 1984)).
164. See id. at 424. Sandra, however, made a desperate attempt to avoid the summary
judgment against her by seeking access to Elsbeth's mental health records in order to prove
that Elsbeth was unfit. See id. at 424 n.5. Although the trial court properly denied Sandra
access to such privileged documents, this is a stark example of the dirty pool commonly
associated with messy divorces. Such war-like tactics can have just as negative an impact
upon the children of same-sex couples as the children of married couples who later separate.
Summer 2001] WISCONSIN & SAME-SEX COUPLES
2. Visitation
The court next addressed whether Sandra would be allowed to seek
visitation rights to the child.' 65 This discussion consumed thirty-two pages
of the court's opinion before concluding that Sandra would be allowed to
petition for visitation rights on remand. The first fourteen pages review the
case law and legislative history surrounding the statutes governing
visitation. The author of the opinion, Justice Abrahamson, attempted to
take a formalistic approach to what seems to be a predominantly equitable
decision to allow Sandra to petition for visitation. Several pages of the
opinion are dedicated to legislative history and case law-possibly to
convince the formalistic dissenters that her opinion was based upon sound
legal reasoning derived from legislative intent and case law.'6 Although
the holding is fair and equitable, the reasoning employed in order to reach
the holding was somewhat disingenuous.
Justice Abrahamson's approach drew several sound attacks from the
various dissenting opinions that pointed out that the majority's reasoning
was questionable if not entirely wrong.'67  Furthermore, Justice
Abrahamson took the liberty of re-opening old wounds from Z.J.H. in order
to overrule a holding with which she and other dissenters disagreed four
years earlier. The irony was not lost on Justice Steinmetz, who aptly
stated,
The majority finds the reasoning of Z.J.H. unpersuasive because it
prevents the majority from reaching its predetermined legal
conclusion. The policy and law of this state have not changed
within the last four years, but the complexion of the court has and,
apparently, the new majority does not place much stock in the
doctrine of stare decisis.
68
Likewise, the majority was criticized for acting like a
"superlegislature," essentially bypassing the legislature's duty to enact the
law. 69 The minority pointed out that, although the majority believed it to
be their duty to interpret broadly the current statutes, the legislature had in
fact responded in the past by enacting new family law statutes in response
to Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions that were decided contrary to
legislative intent.
165. See id. at 425.
166. See id. at 425-34.
167. See id. 445-50 (Steinmetz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. Id. at 448 (Steinmetz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Here, the majority
consisted of Abrahamson, Heffernan, Geske and Bablitch; the minority consisted of
Steinmetz, Day and Wilcox. In Z.J.H., the majority consisted of Callow, Day, Steinmetz,
Heffernan and Ceci; the minority consisted of Abrahamson and Bablitch. In Angel Lace M.,
the majority consisted of Steinmetz, Geske, Wilcox and Day; the minority consisted of
Heffernan, Abrahamson and Bablitch. See RANNEY, supra note 1, at 702-04.
169. Id. at 451 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
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Despite the criticisms, and arguably ends-oriented analysis, the holding
on the issue of visitation was correct. Justice Abrahamson recognized in
the case of Z.J.H. that same-sex couples and their children were unfairly
treated by the current state of the law in Wisconsin, and she took the
opportunity to correct a gap in the visitation statutes when she gained the
majority position in H.S.H.-K. Undoubtedly, the minority here (who was
also the corresponding majority in Z.J.H.) got it wrong. Justice Steinmetz's
dissent, for instance, included several statements that indicate his
misunderstanding of the plight of same-sex couples with children. One
example is:
[Sandra] Holtzman and [Elsbeth] Knott are not legally married, nor
could they be under the laws of this state. The fact that two people
of the same sex make a commitment to each other, exchange vows
and rings in a private ceremony, and are named as a child's parents
at the child's religious dedication ceremony is all irrelevant to the
issue of visitation.
1 70
That Justice Steinmetz found these factors irrelevant is
incomprehensible. These factors are not only relevant, but potentially
determinative in the case of same-sex couples. These factors show that
Sandra and Elsbeth took every symbolic action conceivable in order to hold
themselves out to the community as the parents of H.S.H.-K. These factors
also show that, had the option to marry been available to them, they would
have legitimized their relationship to the state. Sandra and Elsbeth were
trapped in a catch-22. They both wanted to be legally bound as parents to
H.S.H.-K., but the only way to do that was through marriage, an option
they were denied by the state. Their situation was enunciated, ironically,
by Justice Steinmetz's query: "one must wonder whether the majority
would go to such lengths to reach the same conclusion if the person
petitioning for visitation in this case were the biological mother's live-in
boyfriend."'' The answer, one would hope, is no. States have a public
policy interest in promoting and protecting familial relationships through
marriage. Therefore, there is less reason for the court to protect a
heterosexual partner's right to visitation with a child, because the
heterosexual couple has the option to marry in order to legitimize and
protect their commitment to each other and their children in the eyes of the
state. Same-sex couples simply do not have the same options as a
heterosexual couple and, therefore, should be entitled to greater equitable
protections by courts when they go to great lengths to solemnize their
relationships and commitments in other ways.
Ironically, the court in this case also was in a catch-22. The majority
170. Id. at 445 & n.4.
171. Id.at449n.11.
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had to find a way to recognize the visitation rights of same-sex partners not
previously protected by statute without recognizing the so-called "de facto
divorce" of the same-sex couple. Justice Abrahamson set forth a new test
to determine when a court should exercise its equitable power to grant
visitation. A petitioner for visitation must demonstrate that (1) petitioner
has a parent-like relationship with the child and (2) a significant triggering
event justifies state intervention in the child's relationship with a biological
or adoptive parent.' The petitioner must prove four elements to satisfy the
establishment of a parent-like relationship:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-
like relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child
lived together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner
assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant
responsibility for the child's care, education and development,
including contributing towards the child's support [not necessarily
monetary], without expectation of financial compensation;
[footnote omitted] and (4) that the petitioner has been in a parental
role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the
child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.'
In addition, to establish a significant triggering event, petitioner must
prove that the biological or adoptive parent "has interfered substantially
with the petitioner's parent-like relationship with the child, and that the
petitioner sought court ordered visitation within a reasonable time after the
parent's interference."'7
The most notable problem with this new test is that while it achieves
the goal of providing an equitable remedy for same-sex partners seeking
visitation, it also supplies a remedy for heterosexual couples who chose not
to marry. In doing so, the majority's test removed an incentive for couples
to marry, which runs counter to the state policy of promoting legitimate
familial relationships.
IV. THE SOLUTION: LEGALIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
In order to simplify the court's decision in future same-sex custody
battles and re-establish all couples' incentive to marry, the state legislature
should have reacted to these decisions by legalizing same-sex marriages.
Although equal protection claims were brought in the case of In re Interest
of Angel Lace M. on behalf of both Annette and Angel, the court itself
pointed out that an equal protection claim based on Annette's sexual
172. See id. at 421.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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orientation and/or gender should have been aimed at Wisconsin's
prohibition of same-sex marriages instead of the adoption statutes. 5 The
parties could and should have argued that the equal protection provisions
that currently exist under state law be extended to include the right to
marry. In the absence of a direct assault on the prohibition of marriage, the
court has been hesitant to order the legislature to take action. 6 Were the
couples to attack the point directly, they might have had more success, as
evidenced by the Vermont Supreme Court's recent order to the Vermont
legislature to come up with a statutory scheme granting same-sex couples
similar marriage rights under the common benefits clause of the state
constitution."
The Vermont Supreme Court, however, gave the state legislature the
option of either allowing same-sex couples to marry or granting same-sex
couples legally binding "domestic partnerships."''  The legislature
approved "civil unions" that grant same-sex couples all the rights and
benefits provided to heterosexual married couples. 9 The innovation of
civil unions, while groundbreaking, is sub-optimal. The legislation,
unfortunately, falls under the rubric of "separate but equal," which the
United States Supreme Court has determined is "inherently unequal."'' 0 In
addition, the adoption of civil unions will require the legislature to amend
possibly hundreds of other statutes to allow for its application, as opposed
to simply amending the definition of marriage, which would both give
same-sex couples equal rights as well as make the transition an easier one
for the legislature.'8 '
An argument often used in favor of legalizing same-sex marriages is
the poignant analogy to the landmark case of Loving v. Virginia.'2 In
Loving, a black woman and a white man, who had married in the District of
Columbia and moved to Virginia, were convicted and sentenced under the
state's miscegenation statutes." Their convictions were confirmed by the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which pointed to the state's interest in
preserving racial integrity.' 4 Petitioners, however, pointed out that the
miscegenation statutes only protected the integrity of the white race, as
175. 516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1994).
176. See id.; H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 422.
177. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
178. See id. at 886-88.
179. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (West 2000).
180. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Deb Price,
"Separate But Equal" Policy is Never Fair, DET. NEwS, Feb. 28, 2000, at A9.
181. See Deb Price, supra note 180, at A9 (noting over 1,000 federal benefits granted to
couples who marry); Elaine Herscher, Most Gays Embrace Right to Marry, But Others Ask
"Why?", S.F. CHRON., Feb. 22,2000, at A13 (same).
182. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Mark Strasser, Loving in the New Millenium: On Equal
Protection and the Right to Marry, 7 U. OF C. L. SCH. RouND TABLE 61 (2000).
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there was no prohibition against intermarriage between any other non-white
races.' The United States Supreme Court agreed and struck down the
statute's maintenance of white supremacy as violating the United States
Constitution's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 86
Just as the miscegenation statutes promoted and enforced white
supremacy, it has been argued that current statutes prohibiting marriages
between same-sex couples promote and enforce heterosexual supremacy
and proscribed gender roles.' The perceived threat to proscribed gender
roles is reflected in federal and state legislators' recent attempts to define
marriage. The Defense of Marriage Act was passed in 1999 and states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage"
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.'88
Likewise, California voters recently passed ballot Proposition 22,
known as the "Knight Initiative," which sought to preserve the status quo:
"Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California." The fear and hatred behind the proposition was evident in a
Defense of Marriage Campaign letter:
[I]f we allow the "gay marriage" activists to beat Prop. 22, I
[Senator Pete Knight] guarantee you that legalized "same-sex
marriage" is just around the corner for our entire nation. We must
not allow that to happen. As the Revolutionary War patriot
Thomas Paine said: "All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for
good men to do nothing." Thomas Paine was right. But I know
there are enough good people in California to carry Prop. 22 to
victory .. ..89
The letter is replete with war metaphors and a sense of doom should
same-sex marriage ever become a reality. The fear and hatred behind such
proposed and enacted statutes are, no doubt, reminiscent of the same fear
and hatred that prompted enactment and enforcement of the miscegenation
statutes in several states. Just as racist laws are now so obviously immoral
and unjust, so should it be realized that current anti-gay laws are immoral
and unjust. The old concerns for maintaining racial purity are no different
185. See id. at I In.ll.
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than the new concern for maintaining a "heterosexual purity" by forcing
people into traditional gender roles."9
V. CONCLUSION
Many people, including judges and legislators, are uncomfortable with
the idea of homosexuality and do not want to condone it through the
legalization of same-sex marriages. The point of this argument, however,
is not simply that gays and lesbians should have the right to marry just like
everyone else. The point is that same-sex couples are finding new and
innovative ways to create their own families, and that it is the children of
these families that desperately need the legal protections afforded to the
children of traditional families. Judges and legislators cannot ignore these
children. Children do not choose their parents. The children of dissolving
same-sex couples are traumatized just as much as the children of dissolving
heterosexual couples. The best interests of the child always should be the
foremost concern, regardless of the sexual orientation of the child's
parents.
190. Law, supra note 187, at 187.
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